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Update: Contracts in 2008
Abstract
Marketing and production contracts covered 39 percent of the value of U.S. agricul-
tural production in 2008, up from 36 percent in 2001, and a substantial increase over 28 
percent in 1991 and 11 percent in 1969. However, aggregate contract use has stabilized 
in recent years and no longer suggests a strong trend. Contracts between farmers and 
their buyers are reached prior to harvest (or before the completion stage for livestock) 
and govern the terms under which products are transferred from the farm. Contracts are 
far more likely to be used on large farms than on small farms, and they form one element 
in a package of risk management tools available to farmers. Production contracts are used 
widely in livestock production, while marketing contracts are important to the production 
of many crops. 
Keywords: Production contracts, marketing contracts, farm structure, farm size, farm 
income, contracting, Agricultural Resource Management Survey, ARMS, risk analysis
Acknowledgments
We received helpful comments and advice from Richard Barton from USDA’s National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, Gary McBryde from USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers 
and Stockyards Administration, Andrea Woolverton from USDA’s Economic Research 
Service (ERS), and Darrel Good from the University of Illinois. John Weber and Susan 
DeGeorge from ERS provided excellent editing and design services.
James M. MacDonald, macdonal@ers.usda.gov 
Penni Korb, pkorb@ers.usda.gov ii
Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts in 2008 / EIB-72
Economic Research Service / USDA
Contents
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Why Use Contracts?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Data on Contracting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
The Use of Contracts in Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 
Contracts in Selected Major Commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33iii 
Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts in 2008 / EIB-72
Economic Research Service / USDA
Summary
What Is the Issue?
Formal contractual arrangements in agriculture are substitutes for spot 
market (cash) sales of farm commodities and now account for 40 percent of 
the value of U.S. agricultural production. Marketing and production contracts 
are reached prior to harvest (or before the completion stage for livestock). 
Marketing contracts govern the terms of exchange for sales of products 
from the farm—the product to be delivered; the quantity, location, and time 
window for delivery; and a price or pricing formula. Production contracts 
govern an entire production process—farmers are paid a fee to grow an 
animal or crop for a contractor who provides some production inputs and 
who removes the product from the farm for processing or marketing at the 
close of the production cycle. 
Contracts can have many beneficial effects. They can help farmers manage 
price and production risks, they can elicit the production of products with 
specific quality attributes by tying prices to those attributes, and they can 
smooth flows of commodities to processing plants, thus encouraging more 
efficient use of farm and processing capacities. But contracts can also 
have less benign effects. They can introduce new and unexpected risks for 
farmers—in some circumstances, they can extend a buyer’s market power—
and they can effect fundamental changes in how farming is organized and 
carried out. 
This study updates previous ERS research by tracking the use of contracts in 
U.S. agriculture through 2008. It also provides detailed analyses of contract 
use in three areas: 
•	Hog and poultry production, where production contracts predominate 
•	Major field crop production, where the use of marketing contracts has 
expanded
•	Peanut and tobacco production, which has experienced a shift to marketing 
contracts following major changes in Government programs
In each case, ERS analyzes the functions filled by contracts, their design, and 
their adoption and impacts.
What Did the Study Find?
•	Agricultural contracts covered 39 percent of the value of U.S. agricultural 
production in 2008, compared with 28 percent in 1991 and 11 percent in 
1969. In 2005, however, contracting covered 41 percent of production. 
The inter-year decline in the use of contracts after 2005 largely stemmed 
from a change in the composition of agricultural production, as prices and 
revenues rose for commodities less reliant on contracts. 
•	Contracts are more widely used in some commodities than in others. In 
2008, contracts covered 90 percent of poultry production and 68 percent 
of hog production. They also covered 90 percent of sugar beet and tobacco 
production. Contracts are much less prevalent in corn (26 percent of iv
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production), soybeans (25 percent), and wheat (23 percent), although use 
of contracting in each of those field crops grew by at least 10 percentage 
points between 2001 and 2008.
•	Hog and poultry operations rely heavily on production contracts—which 
specify services provided by producers—but with important distinctions 
between the two industries. Hog contract enterprises are usually part of 
larger, diversified farming businesses, with the hog segment providing a 
relatively small share of the farm income. The farmers typically have a 
range of alternative outlets for contract hog production, and farm diversifi-
cation provides a range of alternative uses for their own time. Farm house-
holds that engage in contract hog production have relatively high incomes 
compared with other households—both farm and nonfarm.
In contrast, contract broiler enterprises are likely to be part of smaller and 
less diversified farm businesses, and many broiler operations have only a 
single contractor in their area. As a result, their farm businesses are much 
more dependent on contract production, and their income from contract 
production is much more dependent on a single buyer. Operators of broiler 
farms have lower household incomes, on average, than operators of hog 
farms, and they depend far more on off-farm employment and income. 
•	Corn, soybean, and wheat producers who use contracts tend to be larger 
producers who use marketing contracts to cover a substantial share of 
production. For these producers, marketing contracts—which focus on 
the commodity delivered rather than the services provided—are used 
to manage price risks in combination with cash sales, financial hedges, 
and storage options. Less than 20 percent of corn, wheat, and soybean 
production comes from farms that are fully exposed to cash markets for 
marketing options.
•	Because larger farms tend to earn higher returns than smaller farms, 
production is expected to continue to shift to larger operations and to 
contracts. Contracting, however, is driven not only by expanding farm 
sizes but also by market developments that alter farmers’ marketing risks. 
For example, Federal marketing programs for tobacco and peanuts limited 
price fluctuations for those commodities. Marketing contracts also help 
farmers to manage price risks; but as long as Federal programs limited 
such risks, farmers had little interest in marketing contracts. After Federal 
programs were terminated, however, and producers faced significant spot 
market price risks, contract production in peanuts and tobacco increased 
sharply. Marketing contracts in tobacco are also designed to better align 
prices to product qualities that buyers desire, and this feature played a role 
in processors’ desire to shift to contracts. Thus, farmers turn to contracts 
when they perceive the efficacy of spot markets to be inadequate in 
handling their risks, and processors turn to contracts as a way to encourage 
farmers to produce specific products at desired times. v 
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How Was the Study Conducted?
The analysis primarily draws on data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS), a joint effort conducted annually by ERS and 
USDA's National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). ARMS is USDA’s 
primary source of information on the financial condition, production prac-
tices, resource use, and economic well-being of U.S. farm households. The 
survey asks farmers about the use of production or marketing contracts and 
the volume of production and receipts for each commodity under contract. 
ARMS has been conducted annually since 1996. The Farm Costs and Returns 
Survey (a predecessor to ARMS) provides contract data back to 1991, and 
the Census of Agriculture, conducted by NASS, provides contract data back 
to 1969.1 
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Introduction
Formal contractual arrangements cover a considerable share of U.S. agri-
cultural production. Contracting is associated with other features of ongoing 
structural change in agriculture, including shifts of production to larger 
farms, increased farm specialization, and greater product differentiation. 
This study was conducted to update ERS research that tracked agricul-
tural contracting through 2005.1 We extend data on trends in agricultural 
contracting through 2008 and then provide three new analyses of develop-
ments in contracting for specific commodities: the increased use of produc-
tion contracts in the hog and broiler industries; the recent sharp expansion of 
marketing contracts in major field crops; and the expansion of contracting in 
peanuts and tobacco following changes in Federal agricultural policy. 
In this study, we distinguish three methods for transferring commodities from 
farms to the next stages of food production:
1. Spot (or cash) markets. In spot markets, producers are paid for their 
products when ownership of the product is transferred off the farm, with 
prices based on prevailing market prices at the time of sale, under agree-
ments reached at or after harvest. These may be thought of as cash-and-
carry transactions. Buyers may pay premiums or discounts related to 
product quality, based on factors observable or agreed to at the time of 
sale. Farm operators control production decisions, such as the types of 
farm inputs to buy, as well as when and how to apply them. Operators 
also make financing decisions and marketing arrangements, including 
finding a seller, determining a price, and delivering the product. Spot 
markets still govern most farm product transactions.
2. Vertical integration. Products can also be transferred through vertical 
integration, which combines the farm and downstream use of a 
commodity under single ownership. For example, a winery may own 
and operate vineyards, a citrus processor may own and operate orange 
groves, and a meatpacker may own and operate hog farms or cattle 
feedlots.2 Farmers can also integrate across stages of production—for 
example, a dairy farmer may choose to grow feed for the dairy onsite.3 
3. Agricultural contracts. Many farm product transactions are organized 
through agreements between farmers and buyers that are reached prior 
to harvest (or before the completion of a production stage, as in the 
case of livestock) and that govern the terms under which products are 
transferred from the farm. Contracts provide for much closer linkages 
between farmers and specific buyers than spot markets and may provide 
the contractor/buyer with greater control of agricultural production deci-
sions. Specific contractual designs in agriculture vary, but we find that a 
simple two-way classification is informative.4 
 
a. Production contracts specify services provided by a farmer for a 
contractor who owns the commodity while it is being produced. The 
contract covers (1) the services provided by the farmer, (2) the manner 
in which the farmer is to be compensated for the services, and (3) the 
1MacDonald et al. (2004), MacDonald 
and Korb (2006), and MacDonald and 
Korb (2008). Earlier ERS analyses of 
contracting include Mighell and Jones 
(1963) and Perry et al. (1996).
2Vertical integration that links farms 
with processors or retailers is still rela-
tively uncommon. USDA’s 2008 Agri-
cultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS) asked respondents if they “…
were part of a larger firm or corpora-
tion, such as a branch of a firm that also 
processes the agricultural product of 
the operation?” Affirmative responses 
covered 7,450 farms (0.3 percent of all 
farms) and 5 percent of the value of 
production in agriculture. 
3Farmers may also collectively inte-
grate into commodity marketing and 
processing, or input provision, through 
farmer-owned cooperatives. According 
to ARMS, about 17 percent of farms re-
ceived cooperative refunds or dividends 
in 2008, and those farms accounted for 
43 percent of the value of agricultural 
production (not all of their produc-
tion was marketed through co-ops, of 
course, and the production that was so 
marketed could have been transferred 
through spot market transactions or 
through contracts).
4ARMS questions must be understood 
by a broad cross-section of producers, 
and they must fill a limited space on 
a survey, so our choice is bound by 
survey considerations. But we have not 
found any other two-way classification 
to be a compelling alternative, nor have 
we found a three-way classification 
that will yield reporting benefits com-
mensurate with the additional burden 
placed on respondents.2
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specific contractor responsibilities for provision of inputs. For example, 
farmers provide labor, housing, and equipment under livestock and 
poultry production contracts, while contractors provide such other inputs 
as feed, veterinary and livestock transportation services, and young 
animals.  
 
The farmer’s payment resembles a fee paid for the specific services 
provided by the farmer, instead of a payment for the market value of the 
product. Since contractor-provided inputs may account for a large share 
of production costs, the fee paid to the farmer may be a small fraction of 
the commodity’s value.  
 
b. Marketing contracts focus on the commodity as it is delivered to the 
contractor, rather than on the services provided by the farmer. They 
specify a commodity’s price or a mechanism for determining the price, a 
delivery outlet, and a quantity to be delivered. The parties in a marketing 
contract agree to its terms before harvest or, for livestock, before transfer. 
We consider agreements reached on harvested commodities in storage to 
be cash market sales. 
 
Forward cash contracts are one type of marketing contract, in which 
a specific price is agreed upon at the time of the agreement, with the 
commodity to be delivered at a later agreed-upon date. But other types 
of marketing contracts, often of longer duration, specify a method or 
formula for determining prices, rather than a specific price, at the time of 
agreement.  
 
Contract pricing mechanisms may limit a farmer’s exposure to the 
risks of wide fluctuations in market prices, and they often specify price 
premiums to be paid for commodities with desired levels of specified 
attributes (such as oil content in corn or leanness in hogs). The farmer 
owns the commodity during production and retains substantial control 
over major management decisions, with limited direction from the 
contractor, and, hence, retains more autonomy in decisionmaking than is 
available under production contracts.3 
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Why Use Contracts?
Contracts offer several advantages to farmers. First, they reduce the income 
risks that arise from fluctuations in commodity prices and yields. Second, 
contracts can assure farmers of outlets for commodities in markets with few 
buyers and, thus, assure a better return on investments in physical capital and 
time. Finally, contracts can also tie prices more closely to product attributes 
and, thereby, provide returns to farmers who can provide those attributes.5 
Price and Production Risks
Production and price fluctuations provide two major sources of income risks. 
Most farmers seek to mitigate risk and would pay to do so; risk can also 
impose costs if farmers cannot meet recurring financial obligations or make 
long-term production and investment decisions.
Price risks arise from unanticipated changes in output or input prices, which 
occur commonly because of unexpected changes in production or demand. 
Production contracts can eliminate most or all output price risk by making 
contract fees independent of market prices. Such contracts can also eliminate 
most input price risk because contractors provide the inputs that account for 
most operating expenses. Marketing contracts, too, can substantially reduce 
a farmer’s output price risks. The cash-forward marketing contracts used in 
grain and livestock production typically establish a base price before harvest 
and provide for delivery of a given quantity of a good within a specified time. 
Such contracts can set an exact price or they can set a “basis” price, tying a 
contract price to a price in a futures market, plus or minus some agreed-upon 
amount (the basis). Farmers can offset price fluctuations in the contracted 
crop by hedging with the purchase of a futures contract, thus eliminating 
price risks. 
Production risks for crops result from unpredictable events such as drought, 
frost, hail, disease, and insect infestations. Production risks for livestock 
can arise from disease, feed supply shortages, extreme temperatures, or 
machinery malfunctions. Contracts can be designed to limit production risks. 
For example, production contracts that base compensation on a grower’s 
relative performance can eliminate production risks that are common to all 
growers in a region. 
Holdup, Risks to Capital Investment,  
and Market Access
Contracts can also be used to provide assurance to farmers that specialized 
capital investments can be recouped, particularly in the case of investments 
associated with perishable products in markets with few buyers. For example, 
specialized broiler houses offer optimal growing conditions and are designed 
to facilitate feed delivery, regulate temperature through ventilation and 
cooling systems, and incorporate specific feed and water delivery systems. 
Similarly, sugar beet production requires highly specialized harvesting equip-
ment and extensive prior investment in seed beds. 
Chickens cannot be shipped far before losing value, due to both the direct 
costs of transport or extra feed and the indirect costs from the birds losing 
5For a more complete discussion, with 
references, see MacDonald et al., 2004.4
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value due to stress, weight loss, or death during transport, or aging during 
additional feeding. Similarly, sugar beets lose value quickly, and transport 
costs are still quite high. Because chickens and sugar beets are perishable, 
growers must produce for nearby buyers, and these outlets for their products 
may be limited in number. 
Under such circumstances, a spot market buyer could force very low prices 
on a farmer, knowing that he or she has few or no alternative outlets (that 
is, the processor “holds up” the farmer for a lower price). The product’s 
perishability matters here; in contrast, grain farmers can ship products long 
distances without deterioration or loss of value, and they can also store 
their products for long periods while searching for more marketing options. 
Consequently, grain producers have more marketing options and face fewer 
risks of holdup by local buyers.
The possibility of holdup can ultimately affect processors as well because 
farmers may respond to holdup risks by avoiding capital investments that 
would leave the farmer dependent on the goodwill of one buyer. In that case, 
processors would be unable to elicit investments in technology and exper-
tise that would reduce costs, improve product qualities, and expand their 
businesses. 
In this instance, a contract can benefit farmers and processors by enabling 
them to devise a compensation scheme before the investments are made, thus 
eliminating the risk of holdup. By offering such a contract, the processor 
can obtain investment commitments from farmers and thereby assure the 
commodity supply needed to support an expensive investment in processing 
facilities for perishable agricultural products. 
More broadly, contracts can assure farmers of market outlets for products and 
can enable processors to obtain assured supplies of commodities. Such assur-
ances are important in many production processes. For example, a hog inte-
grator may remove market hogs from finishing houses on a Tuesday, clean 
and sanitize the houses on Wednesday and Thursday, and place a new batch 
of feeder pigs in the houses on Friday. Without an assured market outlet and 
delivery date for market hogs, the producer would not be able to realize the 
high-capacity utilization that this process provides. Similarly, meatpackers 
may realize economies of scale in slaughter and processing if they are able 
to move steady large volumes of livestock through their plants. Contracts 
enable them to manage those flows.
Lenders also prefer assured market outlets because such assurance reduces 
the risks of default on facility loans. Farmers that make substantial facilities 
investments often use debt financing, and lenders often require borrowers to 
have a contract and, therefore, an assured outlet in place before they provide 
a long-term facilities loan. 
Quality Assurance
Contracts can also lead to improvements in product quality. For example, 
processors of vegetables and fruits require commodities with specific quali-
ties and varieties. Processors can secure the needed qualities and varieties 
through spot markets if effective measurement technologies and widely 5 
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understood metrics exist, to be applied at sale. For example, the key distinc-
tive attributes in high-protein soybeans can be precisely measured with near-
infrared measurement technology. 
But some quality attributes are hard to measure, so quality must be assured in 
other ways. Most fresh market lettuce and virtually all processed vegetables 
are grown under contracts specifying a coordinated production process. 
These contracts typically specify seed stock, fertilizer and chemical inputs, 
and product qualities; the contractor may even provide these inputs to the 
farmer and monitor crop development and production processes through 
field visits. The contract helps assure quality attributes by closely specifying 
production processes.
Buyers are increasingly interested in identity-preserved products, such as 
organically produced commodities or specialty grains with specific attri-
butes, which are segregated in the marketing chain. Contracts help assure 
compliance with identity-preserved standards by specifying production and 
harvesting practices, and the means to verify them, at key production stages. 
Attribute certification is met through contractual control and onsite inspec-
tion of practices, rather than through information, tests, and warranties 
provided by producers.
Risks From Contracts
Agricultural contracts can lead to improvements in efficiency throughout the 
supply chain for products by providing farmers with incentives to deliver 
products that consumers want and to produce products in ways that reduce 
processing costs and, ultimately, retail prices (RTI International, 2005). 
However, contracts can also increase certain types of risks for farmers. 
While contracting can reduce the income risks arising from commodity 
price and yield fluctuations, they may create other kinds of income risks for 
producers. Contracts may commit the farmer to delivering a specific quantity, 
thus potentially increasing the cost of a production shortfall, if the commit-
ment would have to be met through spot market purchases. Contracts that 
tie a grower to a single purchaser of a specialized commodity, even if they 
provide for fair compensation of the grower, still leave the grower subject to 
default risks should the contractor fail.
Contracts may create long-term holdup risks at the time of contract renewal. 
Some producers make substantial long-term capital investments as part of 
livestock or poultry production contracts, and those investments may tie the 
producer to a single buyer. If the contract covers a shorter term than the life 
of the capital, then the farmer may face the holdup risk that the contractor 
may require new investments or may impose lower returns at the time of 
contract renewal. If contractors already possess some market power, in the 
form of the ability to force grower prices below competitive levels, some 
contracts can extend that power by raising the costs of entry for new compet-
itors, or allowing for price discrimination. Because contracts can create 
new risks, contract adoption depends not only on contract design but also 
on the performance of the primary alternatives—spot markets and vertical 
integration. 6
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Producers may be able to avoid the costs of holdup risks, and of contractor 
market power, through vertical integration. But vertical integration makes 
for a more complex firm, which may be difficult to manage. Farm operators 
become farm managers in vertically integrated businesses and may not be 
required to provide the effort or the decisionmaking that they would in the 
role of an owner/operator.
If the spot market for a commodity exhibits significant price or production 
risks, or if spot market transactions cannot generate the information needed 
to manage risk, then farmers may prefer to use contracts. If spot markets are 
thin, such that there are few buyers for a product, then farmers will be more 
likely to use contracts. 7 
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Data on Contracting
This report relies extensively on data collected in USDA’s Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey (ARMS). Conducted by USDA's National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and ERS, ARMS includes annual 
information from a stratified random sample of all U.S. farms. It is USDA’s 
primary source of information on financial conditions, production practices, 
and resource use on U.S. farms, and on the economic well-being of U.S. farm 
households. 
The survey consists of three phases:
1. Phase I, conducted during the summer of the reference year, screens 
farms that are targeted for sample inclusion for continued operation and 
commodity mix.
2. Phase II, conducted during the fall of the reference year, includes 
randomly selected operating farms from Phase I, which are interviewed 
to collect information on production practices and chemical use. Data in 
Phase II are collected at the individual field or production unit level.
3. Phase III, conducted during the following winter and spring (just after 
the end of the reference year), includes the collection of data on farm and 
farm household finances and farm production and marketing decisions.
Contracting information is drawn from Phase III, which contains multiple 
questionnaire versions (five in 2008). All versions ask farmers for the volume 
of production, receipts, and unit prices or fees received for each commodity 
under a marketing or production contract. Version 5, also known as the core 
version, is distributed and returned by mail and is shorter than the other 
versions, which are conducted through personal interviews. Version 1 is 
directed to all types of farms, while the remaining versions are directed to 
producers of specific commodities. Additional survey information can be 
found at www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/arms/. 
In 2008, the full Phase III sample consisted of 34,000 farm operations, from 
which 21,816 usable surveys were obtained. The responses contained infor-
mation on quantities and revenues, by commodity, for 12,121 marketing 
contracts and 2,195 production contracts. Additional detail was also obtained 
from the 3,378 marketing contracts and 885 production contracts reported in 
version 1 surveys.6 6 Two features distinguish the contract-
ing data in ARMS from that in other 
surveys. ARMS surveys farms, so the 
focus is on commodities as they leave 
the farm. Surveys of processors focus 
on processor commodity purchases 
from farmers and intermediaries. Also, 
ARMS defines contracts as agreements 
reached prior to harvest. Agreements 
covering the sale of harvested com-
modities from storage are not defined 
as agricultural contracts in ARMS.8
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The Use of Contracts in Agriculture
We use recent data from ARMS, and earlier data from the Census of 
Agriculture, to trace the growth of contracting in agriculture and to show 
how that growth varies among commodities, contract types, and farm types.7 
This section extends analyses provided in earlier ERS reports to 2008.
Contracts and the Value of Production
Only 12 percent of U.S. farms had contracts in 2008, but contracts covered 
38.5 percent of the value of U.S. agricultural production. Over the last 
three decades, the share of the value of agricultural production covered by 
contracts has grown substantially, from 11 percent in 1969, to 28 percent in 
1991, and to 36 percent in 2001 (fig. 1). However, this trend has slowed in 
recent years, and contracts actually covered a smaller share of the value of 
production in 2008 than in 2005. 
The 2005-08 declines reflect compositional changes due to recent commodity 
price trends. Five major field crops—corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, and 
wheat—accounted for 22.1 percent of the value of all U.S. agricultural 
production in 2005. But because of sharp price increases, they accounted for 
34 percent of the value of production in 2008 (fig. 2). Field crops are less 
likely than other commodities to be produced under contract and more likely 
to be traded in spot markets. With a higher weight accorded to field crops in 
2008 than in 2005, the share of the value of production covered by contracts 
fell. Had field crops accounted for the same share of production in 2008 as 
in 2005, the overall contract share of production would not have fallen but 
instead would have remained unchanged at 41 percent.
Since the share of farms that use contracts is much lower than the share of 
production under contract, it follows that large farms are much more likely 
than other farms to use agricultural contracts.8 A simple three-way classifica-
7Because this report is aimed at a broad 
audience, we do not include tests of 
statistical significance. However, in 
all cases in which we state that one 
measure is larger than another, either 
in cross-section or over time, statistical 
tests support the assertion at a 95-per-
cent level of confidence.
8U.S. farms are extremely heteroge-
neous. USDA defines a farm as any 
place that produces, or would normally 
produce, $1,000 worth of agricultural 
commodities in a year. More than half 
of the 2.2 million farms in the United 
States have sales of less than $10,000 
(and nearly half of those have sales of 
less than $1,000). Few of those very 
small farms, which collectively account 
for less than 2 percent of U.S. agri-
cultural production, use contracts. At 
the other extreme, about 3,400 farms 
with at least $5 million in annual sales 
account for nearly one-quarter of all 
agricultural production (Hoppe et al., 
2007). Most use contracts for at least 
some of their production.





















Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service using U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Agriculture, 1969; 
USDA’s Farm Costs and Returns Survey, 1991; and USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey, 2001-2008.
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tion of commercial, intermediate, and rural residence farms helps show how 
the use of contracts varies among different farm types (table 1). 
Commercial farms include family-operated farms with annual gross sales in 
excess of $250,000 and all nonfamily farms, which can include cooperatives, 
nonfamily partnerships and corporations, or family-owned farms operated 
by a hired manager. Intermediate farms have annual sales below $250,000 
but operators who report that farming is their major occupation. Most farms 
in the United States are rural residence farms—family-operated farms with 
annual sales below $250,000 whose operators report that they are retired 
or that their primary occupation is not farming. For temporal comparisons, 
sales classes are adjusted for inflation using the USDA/NASS index of prices 
received for farm products. 
About half of farms with contracts (52 percent) are commercial farms, and 
commercial farms account for the vast bulk of contract production—92 
percent in 2008 (table 1). Only 13 percent of production at rural residence 
farms and 21 percent at intermediate farms were under contract in 2008, 
compared with 43 percent at commercial farms.9 
Contracting is closely tied to farm size (table 2). Nearly 70 percent of the 
largest farms (those with at least $1 million in annual sales) used contracts in 
2008, compared with 7 percent of small farms. Contracts covered 49 percent 
of production among the largest farms, compared with 16 percent among 
small farms (those with less than $250,000 in annual sales). For the largest 
farms, however, the share in 2008 reflects a dropoff from the share in 2005 
(54 percent). 
9Note that commercial farms had a 
higher share of production—48 per-
cent—under contract in 2005 than in 
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Figure 2
Price trends for major field crops, 2000-09
Price ($)
Note: Prices are per bushel, except for cotton, which is per 10 pounds.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service monthly prices received.10
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Table 1
Share of U.S. farms using contracts and share of value of production under contract,  
by farm type
Farm type
Item Rural residence Intermediate Commercial All farms
----------Shares of contracts within each farm type (percent)----------
Farms with contracts
  2001 3.6 16.0 41.7 11.0
  2003 3.4 13.5 46.7 9.6
  2005 4.1 15.8 49.3 11.1
  2008 4.1 13.9 50.6 12.1
Production under contract
  2001 13.3 24.2 42.2 36.4
  2003 11.6 22.5 46.6 39.1
  2005 12.7 19.8 47.5 40.7
  2008 13.1 21.2 42.5 38.5
----------Shares of each farm type in all contracts (percent)----------
Farms with contracts
  2001 19.6 44.6 35.8 100.0
  2003 23.9 33.3 42.9 100.0
  2005 25.0 32.6 42.4 100.0
  2008 22.1 26.0 51.9 100.0
Production under contract
  2001 2.3 14.4 83.2 100.0
  2003 2.4 10.9 86.7 100.0
  2005 2.4 7.4 90.2 100.0
  2008 2.1 5.7 92.2 100.0
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey,  
2001-08.
Table 2









$1 million or 
more
----------Shares of farms with contracts (percent)----------
2001 6.7 40.3 54.7 65.0
2003 5.5 35.1 52.8 62.6
2005 6.3 41.6 55.8 67.7
2008 6.6 53.2 61.6 69.9
----------Shares of production under contract (percent)----------
2001 17.9 25.5 38.0 50.4
2003 17.9 25.0 38.8 51.4
2005 15.7 25.5 36.7 53.5
2008 16.3 28.5 35.1 48.9
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2008 (all versions).11 
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Table 3 presents data on marketing and production contracts separately. 
Data from earlier years are combined to expand sample sizes and smooth out 
some random fluctuations.10 In 2008, more farms used marketing contracts 
(10 percent) than used production contracts (2 percent) (table 3). Marketing 
contracts also covered a greater share of agricultural output—22 percent 
versus 17 percent. However, production contract coverage has increased 
substantially since 1991-93, a development that primarily reflects the growth 
of poultry production, where production contracts are commonly used to 
produce and market birds, as well as the rapid expansion of production 
contracts in the hog sector. 
Production contracts are rarely used in crops, outside of some seed and horti-
cultural production; livestock accounts for 97 percent of the value of produc-
tion covered by such contracts. Marketing contracts are used in both crop and 
livestock production, although crops accounts for nearly two-thirds of the 
production covered by marketing contracts. 
Contract Coverage of Commodities
An analysis of trends in contract use across commodities finds that 
contracting coverage tilts to livestock, which accounted for 60 percent of the 
value of production under contract in 2008, compared with 40 percent for 
crops (table 4). The commodity shares are nearly reversed for all (contract 
and noncontract) production during the same period, with crops accounting 
10Expanded funding allowed for in-
creased sample sizes after 2002.
Table 3
U.S. farm contracts by type
Item 1991-93 1996-97 2001-02 2005 2008
-----------------------------Percent-----------------------------
Share of farms with contracts
 Any contracts 10.1 12.1 11.2 11.1 12.1
  Marketing contracts 8.2 10.2 9.0 9.3 10.3
    Crop 6.6 8.3 7.4 7.6 9.0
    Livestock 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.4
  Production contracts 2.1 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.2
    Crop 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
    Livestock 1.6 1.6 2.1 1.7 1.8
Share of production under contract
 Any contracts 28.8 32.1 37.7 40.7 38.5
  Marketing contracts 17.0 21.5 19.7 22.0 21.7
    Crop 11.0 12.2 12.7 13.1 14.9
    Livestock 6.0 9.3 7.0 8.9 6.9
  Production contracts 11.8 10.6 18.0 18.7 16.8
    Crop .9 1.0 1.6 0.8 0.5
    Livestock 10.9 9.6 16.4 17.9 16.3
Note: Some farms may have production and marketing contracts, so the share of farms with production contracts, 
plus the share with marketing contracts, adds to more than the share of farms with either kind of contract.  
Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Farm Costs and Returns Survey/Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2008. 12
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for 57 percent of the value of all agricultural production and livestock 
accounting for 43 percent. 
The commodity mix in contract agriculture differs because contract coverage 
varies widely across commodities. Contracts covered 90 percent of poultry 
and egg production in 2008, as well as 68 percent of hog production and 
Table 4
Share of total contract value, by commodity, contract type, and year
Item 1991-93 1996-97 2001-02 2005 2008
By commodity ----------------Share of contract production (percent)----------------
All commodities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Crops 41.4 41.2 37.9 34.2 39.8
  Corn 3.5 5.1 3.5 4.2 10.8
  Soybeans 2.6 3.9 1.7 3.5 6.4
  Fruit 11.6 10.6 9.4 9.9 5.9
  Vegetables 9.8 8.1 6.5 7.4 5.0
  All other crops 14.0 13.6 16.8 9.2 11.7
 Livestock 58.6 58.8 62.1 65.8 60.2
  Cattle 18.6 7.6 10.1 9.6 12.4
  Hogs 2.8 5.1 10.8 13.3 10.3
  Poultry and eggs 20.4 21.1 25.6 24.9 21.8
  Dairy 16.6 24.7 15.1 17.9 15.6
  All other livestock 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2
By contract type/commodity
Both contract types 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Marketing contracts:
 All commodities 59.0 67.0 52.3 54.1 56.4
  Crops 38.3 38.1 33.7 32.2 38.6
   Corn 3.1 5.0 3.5 4.1 10.7
   Soybeans 2.5 3.9 1.7 3.4 6.4
   Fruit 11.2 10.1 9.1 9.9 5.7
   Vegetables 8.3 6.7 4.9 6.1 4.3
   All other crops 13.1 12.3 14.6 8.7 11.5
  Livestock 20.8 28.9 18.6 21.9 17.8
   Dairy 16.1 24.6 14.9 17.9 15.5
   All other livestock 4.3 4.3 3.7 4.0 2.3
 Production contracts:
 All commodities 41.0 33.0 47.7 45.9 43.6
  Crops 3.2 3.2 4.2 2.0 1.2
    Vegetables 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.3 0.7
    All other crops 1.7 1.9 2.6 0.7 0.5
  Livestock 37.8 29.9 43.5 43.9 42.4
    Cattle 16.1 5.0 8.8 7.8 11.1
    Hogs 2.4 4.7 9.8 11.1 9.9
    Poultry and eggs 19.0 20.2 24.4 24.7 21.2
    All other livestock 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.1
Sources:  USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 
1996-2005, all versions; and USDA‘s Farm Costs and Returns Survey, 1991-93.13 
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nearly 54 percent of dairy production (table 5).11 Since the early 1990s, 
contracting has expanded sharply in the hog sector. More broadly, contracts 
covered 53 percent of all livestock production in 2008, up from 33 percent 
in 1991-93, and 27 percent of all crop production, up from 25 percent in 
1991-93. 
Among commodities, poultry, hogs, and dairy occupy a much larger role 
of contract agriculture than their share of all U.S. agriculture (fig. 3). Taken 
together, hogs and poultry (including broilers, turkeys, and eggs) account 
for 32 percent of all contract production, more than double their share of all 
agricultural production. In contrast, major field crops (corn, cotton, soybeans, 
rice, and wheat) account for a much smaller share of contract agriculture than 
their share of all U.S. agriculture. 
Livestock production has been shifting toward a greater reliance on large and 
specialized confinement feeding operations, and these operations often have 
extensive contractual arrangements. Large cattle feedlots often hold produc-
tion contracts with cattle owners and marketing contracts with meatpackers. 
Large dairy farms make use of forward contracts to price milk, and they 
may enter into production contracts with other dairy operations to raise their 
heifers. However, contracts are not used exclusively by large operations in 
11The estimates do not imply that spot 
markets account for the remainder of 
hog and poultry production because 
vertical integration is important in 
those sectors, with processors operating 
some farming operations. Shared equity 
investments, in which feedlots share 
ownership of cattle with cow-calf or 
stocker operations, are also common.
Table 5
Share of commodity production under contract, by commodity
Commodity/Contract type 1991-93 1996-97 2001-02 2005 2008
---------Share of production under contract (percent)--------
All commodities 28.8 32.1 37.7 40.7 38.5
Crops 24.7 22.8 27.8 29.9 27.3
  Corn 11.3 12.9 14.8 19.6 26.1
  Soybeans 10.1 13.4 9.4 18.4 25.1
  Wheat 5.9 9.0 6.5 7.5 22.5
  Sugar Beets 91.1 75.2 96.7 82.1 90.8
  Rice 19.7 25.9 38.7 27.1 45.4
  Peanuts 47.5 34.4 28.0 65.3 73.1
  Tobacco 0.3 0.3 52.7 79.3 99.3
  Cotton 30.4 33.8 52.6 45.0 36.2
  Fruit na 41.7 41.9 48.9 38.4
  Vegetables na 28.0 28.2 40.9 39.3
  Other crops 7.8 23.8 39.5 25.9 22.5
Livestock 32.8 44.9 48.2 50.1 52.8
  Cattle na 17.2 21.0 17.6 29.4
  Hogs na 34.2 62.5 76.2 68.1
  Poultry and eggs 88.7 83.8 92.3 94.2 89.9
  Dairy 36.8 58.3 48.6 59.2 53.9
  All other livestock 0.2 4.9 9.0 2.0 5.0
na = data not available for commodity detail.
Source:  USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management  
Survey, 1996-2005 (all versions); and USDA’s Farm Costs and Returns Survey, 1991-93. 14
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the sector. Small producers of organic poultry or milk rely on contracts to 
assure outlets for their products and to realize the price premiums that such 
products can bring.
Contracts and Debt Use
Farms with contracts carry considerably more debt than farms that do not use 
contracts (Key, 2004). This is true even when we control for, or remove the 
effects of, the farm’s commodity mix and the net worth of the farm business. 
Table 6 provides data on debt use among contract farms and noncontract 
farms sorted into four quartiles of net worth. Contract farms have higher 
ratios of debt to net worth in each quartile. For example, contract farms in 
the highest net worth quartile hold debt equal to 16 percent of net worth, on 
average, compared with 6 percent among noncontract operations. In lower 
net worth quartiles, farms hold higher ratios of debt to net worth than in 
higher quartiles, but contract operations still have much higher ratios than 
noncontract operations.
The pattern holds when farms are further sorted by their primary commodity 
specialization. Grain and oilseed contract operations carry much more debt, 
per dollar of net worth, in every net worth category than noncontract opera-
tions; the same result holds for cattle, hog, and poultry operations (table 6). 
Contract operations carry as much or more debt than noncontract opera-
tions in 30 of the 32 commodity/net worth categories in table 6. In 17 cases, 
contract operations carry more than twice as much debt, per dollar of net 
worth; in only 2 cases do they carry significantly less debt than noncontract 
operations.
Note that contract livestock operations in the lower net worth quartiles (Q1 
and Q2) carry considerable amounts of debt. On average, contract dairy and 
poultry operations in the lowest net worth quartile carry $8 of debt for every 
dollar of net worth, while contract hog operations carry nearly $2. Crop oper-
























Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA’s Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey, 2008.
Commodity share of all production
Commodity share of contract production15 
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Why is debt associated with contract use? Confined livestock feeding opera-
tions require substantial investments in structures, equipment, and live-
stock inventories. Contractors finance livestock and feed inventories under 
production contracts, which reduces the total investment needed by opera-
tors. Lenders may often require borrowers to have a contract in place before 
financing structures and equipment. In examining production contracts for 
hogs, Key (2010) finds some impact of contract adoption, and debt use, on 
subsequent farm growth. Specifically, small hog operations (with less than 
1,000 head in inventory) grew very rapidly after adopting a production 
contract. Larger operations, up to 5,000 head in inventory, also grew faster 
after adopting such contracts. The results suggest that farmers who wished 
to expand may have been better positioned to obtain financing once they 
adopted a production contract.
Table 6
Contracts and debt use among U.S. farms, 2008
Net worth quartiles
Farms by commodity  
specialization Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
-----------Mean ratio of total debt to net worth-----------
All farms
  Noncontract 0.67 0.11 0.08 0.06
  Contract 2.59 0.43 0.24 0.16
Grains, oilseeds
  Noncontract 0.62 0.18 0.13 0.08
  Contract 1.11 0.39 0.21 0.16
Cotton
  Noncontract 1.51 0.17 0.15 0.08
  Contract 0.83 0.23 0.31 0.13
Vegetables
  Noncontract 0.35 0.09 0.06 0.05
  Contract 0.30 0.10 0.34 0.22
Fruits
  Noncontract 2.47 0.08 0.07 0.06
  Contract 2.55 0.08 0.13 0.09
Hogs and pigs
  Noncontract 0.97 0.31 0.07 0.16
  Contract 1.89 0.57 0.30 0.27
Dairy
  Noncontract 0.48 0.26 0.18 0.17
  Contract 8.17 0.39 0.30 0.16
Cattle
  Noncontract 0.60 0.09 0.06 0.04
  Contract 1.51 0.55 0.22 0.15
Poultry
  Noncontract 0.43 0.13 0.11 0.06
  Contract 8.08 0.94 0.36 0.15
Note: Bolded cells are those for which contract farms have lower ratio.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey, 2008, all versions.16
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Contracts in Selected Major Commodities
Contract use varies widely across commodities, and contracts for different 
commodities also exhibit distinctive features. The large sample sizes in 
ARMS, as well as commodity-specific versions of the ARMS questionnaire, 
allow for a detailed look at contract use in certain specific commodities.12 
•	Production contracts in the hog and poultry industries. In 2008, poultry 
alone accounted for over half of all fee revenue received by farmers from 
production contracts, while hog production accounted for 19 percent (table 
7). The focus here is specifically on broiler grow-out and hog finishing, the 
largest contract segments of each industry.
•	Marketing contracts for major field crops. Corn, rice, soybeans, and wheat 
together accounted for 41 percent of all marketing contract revenues in 
2008 (table 8), up from 12 percent in 2005. Part of that increase reflects 
increased commodity prices (and, hence, contract revenues), but marketing 
contracts cover growing shares of production in each crop.
•	Contracting in two specialty crops—peanuts and tobacco—following 
major changes in Federal programs. In each case, policy changes altered 
the risk environment faced by producers, and contracts provided a channel 
for managing new price risks.
Market Organization in Broilers and Hogs
Contract poultry and hog production accounted for 12.3 percent of the value 
of all U.S. agricultural production in 2008, up from 6.7 percent in 1991-93. 
That increase reflects the growth of poultry production, the high share of 
contracting in poultry, and the rapid expansion of hog contracting during the 
1990s. 
Production contracts can be controversial. They link farmers who make 
substantial long-term investments to specific buyers, in relationships that can 
lead to significant commercial disputes. The poultry and hog industries are 
each concentrated, with a few firms dominating slaughter and processing. 
12While ARMS covers all agricul-
tural commodities, sample sizes are 
not large enough to allow for useful 
analyses of contracting for specific fruit 
or vegetable products. Other studies 
have examined contracting in those 
sectors, including Hueth et al. (1999) 
for tomatoes, Dimitri (2001) for apples, 
Goodhue et al. (2003) for wine grapes, 
and Mohapatra et al. (2010) for straw-
berries. 
Table 7
Production contracts and fee volume by commodity, 2008
Commodity Contract fees  Share of total fees
$ million Percent
All commodities 7,357 100.0
All poultry 3,726 50.6
    Broiler grow-out 2,174 29.5
All hogs 1,410 19.2
    Hog finishing 800 10.9
All cattle 1,381 18.7
    Cattle finishing 769 10.4
All other livestock 41 0.6
All crops 799 10.9
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s  
Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2008, all versions. 17 
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Critics contend that contracts can be designed to extend processor market 
power, while supporters argue that contracts reduce costs and increase effi-
ciency. There have been several congressional proposals to regulate produc-
tion contracts, and interest in legislation continues (Johnson and Becker, 
2009; MacDonald, 2006). In June 2010, USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers 
and Stockyards Administration, in response to provisions of the 2008 farm 
bill, issued a proposed ruling that would introduce new regulations for 
production contracts in hog and poultry industries (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2010).
Firms in each industry rely extensively on contracts and on vertical inte-
gration to manage production, processing, and distribution. Nevertheless, 
production contracts in the two industries differ in design and use. 
The broiler industry has a high degree of vertical integration (MacDonald, 
2008). Broiler companies (integrators) own slaughter and processing plants 
from which they ship branded consumer products, and they usually own 
hatcheries and feed mills as well. Hatchery chicks are shipped to contract 
growers, whom integrators also provide with feed and veterinary services. 
Growers provide labor and utilities, along with structures and equipment that 
are usually designed to the integrator’s specifications. Some contract growers 
produce replacement birds for breeding flocks, but most grow broilers for 
meat. 
Because feed is costly to ship, and because chicks and live chickens cannot 
be shipped very far due to the risk of unacceptable mortality losses, contract 
Table 8







Share of total 
revenues
$ million Percent
All commodities 58,128 100.0
1 1 Milk and dairy products 17,440 30.0
2 4 Corn 12,117 20.8
3 6 Soybeans 7,340 12.6
4 23 Wheat, winter 2,198 3.8
5 5 Grapes, fresh 1,554 2.7
6 25 Rice 1,248 2.1
7 2 Cotton, upland 1,045 1.8
8 15 Tomatoes, processed 920 1.6
9 71 Wheat, other spring 857 1.5
10 21 Peanuts 812 1.4
11 19 Tobacco, flue-cured 796 1.4
12 29 Potatoes 715 1.2
13 8 Almonds 704 1.2
14 9 Sugar beets 609 1.0
15 10 Oranges, not Valencia 586 1.0
178 other commodities  9,245 15.9
Note: Top 15 commodities from 2005 that dropped out of the 2008 ranking include veg-
etables, other (3), feeder calves (7), farrow to finish hogs (11), dates (12), nursery crops 
(13), and strawberries (14). 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey, 2008, all versions. 18
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growers and integrator-owned facilities are typically located within 100 miles 
of the integrator’s complex. Compensation of contract growers is usually 
based on their relative performance, under a tournament scheme. That is, 
growers receive a base payment after a flock is delivered for processing, and 
they may receive additional payments that vary with the grower’s feed effi-
ciency and mortality performance (percent of chicks that survive), compared 
with the average performance of a group of other growers of similar birds. 
Production contracts and vertical integration are widespread in the hog 
industry, but not to the degree in the broiler industry (McBride and Key, 
2007). Some hog industry integrators follow the broiler model, in that they 
own feed mills and sow facilities from which they provide pigs to contract 
growers who raise them to market weight before they are transferred to the 
integrator’s slaughter plant. But there are many other models. Some integra-
tors own sow operations, contract with growers to raise the pigs to market 
weight, and then sell the hogs to packers, usually under marketing contracts. 
Others purchase pigs and feed from independent sow operations and feed 
mills, place them on contract growing operations, and then sell the market 
hogs to slaughter plants under a marketing contract. Those integrators own 
no facilities, but instead coordinate the process through contracts and spot 
market purchases. In each case, contract growers receive pigs, feed, veteri-
nary services, and supervision from integrators and provide labor, capital, 
and utilities. 13
The industry also has a significant number of traditional operations. These 
growers raise pigs from birth to market weight and sell them to processors 
through a marketing contract or a cash market sale.
Hog producers do not face the same geographic constraints that broiler 
producers face—hogs and pigs can travel much farther without the risk of 
animals dying en route. With larger geographic markets, hog producers 
have a greater choice of contracting options. Some producers also have spot 
market options, although those are disappearing as spot markets now account 
for less than 10 percent of market hog shipments.
Production Contracting for Broilers and Hogs
In 2008, the median quantity removed under a production contract amounted 
to 380,000 broilers and 6,000 hogs (table 9). Given the capacity of modern 
houses and the amount of time needed to raise broilers and hogs, those quan-
tities were likely met with three to five broiler houses or two hog houses 
per operation. These are typical sizes, but larger operations accounted for 
most production: half of all hog production occurred on farms that raised at 
least 15,500 hogs, while half of all broiler production occurred on farms that 
raised at least 682,200 broilers. Operations of that size would have six to 
seven hog houses or five to six broiler houses. 14
Contract broiler operations are much smaller and more specialized than 
contract hog operations. Broiler operations have just 91 acres of cropland, on 
average, and nearly half have no crop production at all (table 10). Fees from 
 13In some cases, the integrator or a 
third party will own the houses on a 
grower’s operation, with the grower 
providing labor and obtaining manure 
for fertilizer.
14In this analysis, we focus on hog 
finishing operations, which receive 
pigs and raise them to market weight. 
Farrow to wean operations, with sows 
in inventory, are often much larger and 
more specialized.19 
Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts in 2008 / EIB-72
Economic Research Service / USDA
production contracts account for about 75 percent of their gross cash farm 
income. In contrast, contract hog producers have significantly larger crop 
enterprises (590 acres, on average), and production contract fees account for 
less than 20 percent of gross cash income.15 
Farm households derive income from off-farm employment, from “unearned” 
off-farm sources such as pensions or returns from financial investments, and 
from the net income that is provided by the farm business, after accounting 
for expenses and for any claims on the farm’s net income from other entities. 
For most broiler operations, farming is not the primary source of household 
15Contract hog operations use hog 
manure as fertilizer for their crops. 
Contract poultry farms are less likely to 
have crops, and most litter is removed 
from operations and transferred to other 
farms for use as fertilizer (MacDonald 
and McBride, 2009).
Table 9
Characteristics of production contracts for U.S. hogs and  
broilers, 2008 
Item Broilers Market hogs
---------------Head---------------
Annual quantity removed
  Mean 485,116 8,644
  Median 380,000 6,000
  25th percentile 225,000 2,400
  75th percentile 675,000 10,800
----------Dollars per head----------
Fee received
  Mean 0.36 13.40
  Median 0.30 12.00
  25th percentile 0.24 10.67
  75th percentile 0.38 13.73 
Note: The sample includes 916 broiler contract producers and 349 market hog contract 
producers.  
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA's Agricultural  
Resource Management Survey, 2008, all versions.
Table 10
U.S. broiler and hog operations with production contracts, 2008
Item  Broilers Hog finishing 
Farm operations
  Median head removed  380,000 6,000
     Weighted by production 682,200 15,600
  Acres operated (mean) 209 666
  Cropland acres (mean) 91 590
  Percent with no cropland 44 8
Farm financial measures ($)
  Gross cash farm income  198,011 623,379
  Production contract income 147,850 114,947
Farm household income ($)
  Mean total household income 64,179 116,584
  Mean off-farm income 49,289 42,353
  25th percentile, household income 9,793 33,082
  50th percentile, household income 53,487 74,542
  75th percentile, household income 93,995 176,906
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s  
Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2008, all versions. 20
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income. Mean household income from farming operations amounted to 
$14,890 on broiler operations in 2008, compared with mean off-farm income 
of $49,289. The ratio of farm to off-farm income is reversed in households 
that operate contract hog operations, where farming provides 64 percent of 
the household’s income (table 10). 
Contract growers are not, in general, low-income households. In 2008, mean 
household income among all U.S. households was $68,424. Mean household 
income among contract broiler producers was $64,179, when measured on a 
comparable basis using the net income flowing from the farm business, while 
mean household income for contract hog producers was $116,584.16
Incomes among farm households are skewed, as are incomes among all 
households, by the fact that some households earn very high incomes, thus 
raising the mean above the amounts earned by most. For that reason, it is 
important to look at median household incomes and the range of income 
earned by looking at the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
For example, a quarter of households with contract hog operations had 
incomes above $176,906 (the 75th percentile). Those incomes raised the 
mean substantially. The median income was $74,542, well below the mean, 
while another quarter earned incomes below $33,082 (table 10). 
The median household income among broiler farms was $53,487, also 
well below the mean. A quarter of those households earned incomes above 
$93,995, while a quarter earned incomes below $9,793.17  The medians 
compare favorably to nationwide estimates—median income among all U.S. 
households in 2008 amounted to $50,303, below the medians for broiler or 
hog households. 
Household incomes for broiler producers were considerably lower in 2008 
than in 2004, when median household income as reported in an earlier ERS 
study was $64,447. It should be noted that consumer prices rose by 13.9 
percent between 2004 and 2008, so that real (adjusted for inflation) median 
income fell by 27 percent. Fee payments, on a per pound basis, have not 
grown in recent years, while industry production growth also slowed. 
Farmers face risks from many sources. While production contracts can 
reduce the risks from variation in input and product prices and from regional 
weather and disease problems, they can introduce new holdup risks for 
producers who commit to major long- term investments. Specifically, inte-
grators may fail, they may cancel a contract, and they may impose new 
investment requirements on producers. Such risks may be less challenging 
for diversified producers with alternative contract options—that is, hog 
contract growers, as opposed to poultry. 
Broiler producers are closely tied to a single integrator. More than half 
assert that they have no alternative outlets, other than their present inte-
grator, for their broilers, compared with less than a quarter of hog producers 
(MacDonald and Korb, 2008). Broiler contract features are unique to the 
industry and not widely understood by outsiders (see box, “Broiler Contract 
Design”). Broiler operators’ household incomes from farming tend to be 
lower than those of hog producers and more closely tied to the returns from 
16 Among all households of primary 
farm operators, mean household  
income was $81,596.
17Broiler and hog operations with 
recent investments in housing are 
able to claim accelerated depreciation 
expenses from those investments. Many 
consequently have negative net farm 
income and relatively low reported 
household incomes, as the depreciation 
provisions allow them to shelter income 
from taxation.21 
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Broiler Contract Design
Table 1
U.S. broiler production, by type of operation, 2006
Type of operation Farms Removals  Production 
No. Million head Million lbs
Production contract 17,200 8,310 45,606
Processor-owned 163 84 402
Independent 52 31 160
More than one type 14  8 43
Refusal/don’t know 11  5 26
All operations 17,440 8,438 46,237
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2006, version 4.
Table 2
Fees paid in U.S. broiler production contracts, 2006
  Contract fee per pound
Share of 
farms






Percent Percent -------------------------- Cents ----------------------------
Contractor pays for fuel?
   Yes 20 18 4.6 4.3 5.8 3.4
   No 80 82 5.1 5.0 6.2 4.0
Bird size (lbs)
   <4.26  27 22 5.3 5.1 6.6 4.0
   4.26-6.25 30 31 5.0 5.0 6.1 4.0
   6.26-7.75 16 20 5.1 5.1 6.2 3.8
   >7.75 7 9 4.9 5.0 5.9 3.7
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2006, version 4, 
production contracts only.
Production  contracts  cover  nearly  99  percent  of  commer-
cial broiler production, with processor-owned facilities ac-
counting for less than 1 percent (table 1).1 The few inde-
pendent  broiler  farms  produced  an  estimated  31  million 
broilers in 2006, but that accounts for less than 0.4 percent 
of production. 
On average, growers earn fees of about 5 cents per pound, 
on a live-weight basis, of broilers delivered to the processing 
plant (table 2). Actual payments vary widely around the av-
erage and range from 4.0 to 6.6 cents per pound. Integrators 
pay for grower fuel expenses in some regions, such as the 
Delmarva Peninsula in the Mid-Atlantic region, and grower 
fees are lower in those areas. Fees also vary with the size 
of bird produced and tend to fall slightly, on a per pound 
basis, for larger birds. Payments also depend on a flock’s pro-
duction performance, compared with that of flocks of other 
growers. Flocks with lower rates of mortality and feed con-
version (pounds of feed relative to pounds of weight gain) 
generate higher payments. 
Contract features do vary (see figure). Over 90 percent of 
contracts in 2006 based grower payments on performance, 
and almost all of those used a tournament scheme, in which 
performance  is  measured  relative  to  other  producers.  But 
tournaments are not universal—13 percent of farms did not 
receive payments based on tournament performance. Over 
half of producers received seasonal fee adjustments in re-
sponse to changes in energy prices, while 20 percent had fuel 
expenses covered by integrators. Smaller fractions received 
fee adjustments based on the market price for broilers, fa-
cility financing from the integrator, or contract provisions 













Facility financing from integrator
100 80 60 40 20 0
Broiler contract features
Percent of growers with contract feature
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA’s Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey, 2006, version 4.
1Data are drawn from USDA's ARMS, 2006, version 4, which was aimed 
at commercial broiler operations in the 17 largest States for broiler pro-
duction. In turn, those States accounted for over 90 percent of production.22
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contract production. These patterns may help to explain why broiler contract 
relationships have attracted widespread legislative interest and regulatory 
proposals (Doby, 2007; Philippi, 2007; Lawrence and Grimes, 2007).
Marketing Contracts in Field Crops
Contract coverage varies widely among producers of specific field crops. 
Most use no contracts, while those who do usually contract substantial shares 
of production. Moreover, contract use in major field crops has expanded 
sharply in recent years. Crop operations that contract differ in important ways 
from those that do not.
Most field crop operations do not use contracts, while those that do use 
them extensively (table 11). For example, 103,193 corn producers used 
a marketing contract for corn in 2008, while 177,623—63 percent of the 
total—did not. Similarly, 66 percent of soybean producers and 76 percent 
of wheat producers did not use contracts. Even among farms producing 
commodities with higher levels of contract coverage, many do not use 
contracts. Sixty-seven percent of cotton producers, 33 percent of peanut 
producers, and 46 percent of rice producers do not use marketing contracts.
Among field crop farms, those that contract are considerably larger, on 
average, than those that do not, when size is measured by the whole farm’s 
value of production, the specific crop’s value of production, or the crop’s 
harvested acreage. Farms that contract for one crop tend to contract for 
others. For example, corn operations that used a contract in 2008 placed 
48 percent of their corn under contract and also placed 42 percent of their 
other crop production under contracts. Farms that did not use contracts for 
their corn production used contracts for only 6 percent of their other crop 
production. 
Contracts form part of a broad marketing strategy for field crop operators.18 
On average, contract corn operations placed about half of their total corn 
production under contract in 2008 but did not necessarily use spot markets 
for the remainder. Some corn was used onfarm, while some went to landlords 
who held share leases on the land. We estimate that contract corn growers 
diverted 13 percent of their corn production to those channels in 2008, 
leaving 38 percent to be sold through spot markets or retained in storage. 
Contract soybean and wheat producers each diverted about 10 percent of 
production to onfarm use and landlord commitments, leaving 36 percent of 
their soybean production and 34 percent of wheat production to spot markets 
or storage.19 For these producers, noncontract production provides a form 
of “contract insurance”—in the event of low yields, production that is not 
committed to a contract may be used to help fulfill any shortfalls in produc-
tion that is committed to a contract.
The data cited above refer to average contract shares. But individual 
contracting farms varied widely around the mean. Table 12 presents 
contracting farms sorted into quintiles, according to the share of produc-
tion under contract. Among corn, soybean, and wheat operations that used 
contracts, over 60 percent put between 20 and 60 percent of production under 
contract. Many farms, however, fell outside that range: some put all of their 
production under contract, and surprisingly large numbers put either a high 
18Prior studies of risk manage-
ment strategies find that producers 
concerned with managing commodity 
price risks frequently combine several 
tools, including marketing contracts, 
hedging, storage, and enterprise diver-
sification (Harwood et al., 1999).
19As a result, corn, soybean, and 
wheat producers who contracted 
committed most of their market 
production to contracts (56, 60, and 
62 percent, respectively).23 
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share (81-100 percent of production) or a low share (1-20 percent) under 
contract. 
Marketing of rice and cotton looks distinctly different than marketing of 
other field crops. Cotton producers who used contracts shipped most of their 
marketed crops through contracts, and many shipped all of their produc-
tion under contract. Very little went to spot markets. This was also true, to a 
lesser extent, for rice producers.
Table 11
Contract and noncontract U.S. field crop producers in 2008




Farm value of 
production ($)
Commodity







------------------------------------Mean values, across farms-----------------------------------
Corn
  Contract 103,193 589,043 274,173 386 48.2 41.5
  Noncontract 177,623 334,670 120,221 194 0 5.6
Cotton
  Contract 5,110 782,205 252,512 629 88.5 67.9
  Noncontract 10,389 553,282 162,451 419 0.0 24.3
Peanuts
  Contract 4,736 470,714 158,506 219 94.5 41.5
  Noncontract 2,291 368,004 99,188 200 0.0 7.2
Rice
  Contract 3,575 1,117,378 726,973 535 71.3 53.8
  Noncontract 3,091 1,041,569 457,730 351 0.0 21.6
Soybeans
  Contract 98,274 561,264 157,716 375 54.1 39.1
  Noncontract 190,958 335,008 78,906 192 0.0 5.3
Wheat
  Contract 44,861 719,848 176,803 480 56.2 37.4
  Noncontract 143,081 394,486 68,712 232 0.0 10.4
Note: The sample includes 3,218 corn contracts, 319 cotton contracts, 165 rice contracts, 244 peanut contracts, 2,800 soybean contracts, and 
1,444 wheat contracts.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2008, all versions.
Table 12
Distribution of U.S. contracting farms by share of production under contract, 2008
--------------Share of commodity production under contract (percent)--------------
Commodity 1-20 21-40 41-60 61-80 81-100 1-100
-------------Share of farms with contracts in the commodity (percent)--------------
Corn 20.1 27.5 24.6 11.6 16.2 100.0
Cotton 5.4 7.1 3.9 5.1 78.5 100.0
Rice 4.5 18.1 9.8 28.7 38.9 100.0
Soybeans 13.4 25.5 24.0 16.1 21.0 100.0
Wheat 12.6 26.2 20.5 17.1 23.6 100.0
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2008, all versions. 24
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Marketing contracts form part of a portfolio of risk management tools. 
Farmers also use financial hedges in futures and options markets to manage 
risks. They may invest in onfarm storage capacity, which can give them 
greater flexibility to hold crops in storage when they expect prices to rise 
in the future. Producer cooperatives may provide some marketing expertise 
for their members, who can then realize payments for crops delivered to the 
cooperative as well as any cooperative patronage dividends earned on the 
cooperative’s marketing efforts.20
Farms that use contracts also use these other marketing strategies, and 
they are more likely to use them than farms that do not use contracts (table 
13).21 Among the producers of each commodity, farms that use contracts 
are substantially more likely to also use financial hedging strategies, onfarm 
storage, or cooperative marketing than farms that do not use contracts. 
Just over half of corn, soybean, and wheat producers do not make any use 
of marketing contracts, financial hedges, or producer cooperatives. These 
farms are relatively small operations and, together, account for 20 percent of 
all wheat and soybean production and 24 percent of corn production. About 
10 percent of these farms feed their corn and wheat production to livestock 
and, hence, do not market their crops, but most sell their grain and rely exclu-
sively on cash sales. However, by 2008, most corn, soybeans, and wheat 
were produced on farms that used a variety of risk management tools and that 
used marketing contracts as a primary tool.22
20A farmer may have a marketing 
contract with a cooperative, but other 
farmers may simply make a cash sale 
to the cooperative with the expectation 
that they may earn dividends from the 
cooperative’s later marketing actions.
21 The data in table 15 are drawn from 
questions asked on version 1 of ARMS, 
and we did not have enough contracts 
for cotton, peanuts, and rice in version 
1 to provide us with reliable data.
22Our findings differ in some respects 
from the conclusions of Cole and Kir-
wan (2009), who rely on ARMS data 
on marketing contract usage to argue 
that “…relatively little agricultural risk 
is hedged. Few farmers sell product 
forward or trade in futures or options 
markets; moreover, even when farms do 
participate in these markets they hedge 
only a small fraction of their output.” 
Cole and Kirwan used ARMS data for 
1999-2006, when marketing contracts 
covered much less production. They 
focus primarily on individual farms 
rather than production, and on market-
ing contracts alone as a hedging tool.
Table 13
Use of alternative marketing strategies by U.S. corn, soybean, and wheat producers, 2008
Commodity and  






------------------Share of farms using strategy (percent)------------------
Corn
  Contract 15.1 29.2 64.1 61.9 0.0
  Noncontract 6.3 9.1 54.5 39.9 55.2
Soybeans
  Contract 13.8 28.5 63.2 54.8 0.0
  Noncontract 7.1 9.1 51.1 43.1 52.6
Wheat
  Contract 13.3 29.2 56.9 55.1 0.0
  Noncontract 6.6 11.3 48.7 42.9 51.1
Note: “Spot markets only” is defined as farms that do not use marketing contracts, options, futures, or farmer-owned  
cooperatives.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2008,  
version 1.25 
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Expansion of Contracting for Corn,  
Soybeans, and Wheat
Contract coverage for the three largest U.S. field crops—corn, soybeans, 
and wheat—grew in recent years, with a sharp acceleration between 2005 
and 2008.23 Marketing contracts covered 27 percent of corn production in 
2008, up from 19 percent just 3 years before (table 14). Soybeans and wheat 
showed greater increases over the same period (12 and 18 percentage points, 
respectively).
Increased ethanol production could account for the growing use of corn 
contracts because ethanol plants often contract for corn supplies to ensure 
steady flows through processing. Ethanol accounted for 30 percent of U.S. 
corn production by 2008; however, ethanol plants typically procure corn 
from elevators rather than directly from farmers, so expanded ethanol 
production should not necessarily imply expanded contracting by corn 
producers.24 
Commodity prices fluctuated sharply during the period of accelerated 
contracting (fig. 4). Prices began to rise in late 2006 and peaked in 2008, with 
corn at $5.47 per bushel in June, soybeans at $13.30 per bushel in July, and 
wheat at $10.50 per bushel in March—each more than double its value in 
late 2005. Prices then fell substantially from their peaks during late 2008 and 
2009. The wide swings in prices and the consequent uncertainty provided 
farm operators with a strong incentive to seek greater protection through 
marketing contracts. 
Farmers who use marketing contracts placed more of their production under 
contract in 2008 than they had in 2005 (table 14). Contract corn opera-
tions placed 48 percent of production under contract in 2008, up from 44 
23Corn, soybeans, and wheat accounted 
for 225 million planted acres in 2008—
more than half of all U.S. cropland, 
including that left fallow or used only 
for pasture, and 70 percent of the total 
planted to field crops.
24The 2008 ARMS bioenergy version 
contained a section on corn market-
ing; farms in major production States 
reported shipping 66 percent of their 
2008 corn sales directly to grain 
elevators and only 13 percent directly 
to ethanol plants. Other buyers were 
feed mills (5 percent), other farms (5 
percent), and food processing plants (7 
percent), with remaining sales covered 






























Monthly price changes, corn, wheat, and soybeans, 2000-2009
Percent
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service monthly prices received.26
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percent in 2005, while contract soybean and wheat operations placed 54 
and 56 percent under contract, respectively, in 2008, compared with 46 
percent for each in 2005. But the driving force in expanded contracting was 
sharp increases in the proportion of farms that used contracts. In 2008, 36.7 
percent of corn farms used a marketing contract, up from 22 percent in 2005; 
34 percent of soybean producers and 24 percent of wheat producers held 
marketing contracts for those commodities in 2008, up from 18 percent and 
10 percent, respectively, in 2005.
Prices and Quantities in Marketing Contracts  
for Field Crops
Prices received by U.S. farmers under marketing contracts for corn, cotton, 
soybeans, and rice consistently exceeded estimates of nationwide average 
prices received for those commodities in 2008 (table 15). Rice was the 
exception to this pattern among field crops, with contract prices falling well 
below average NASS prices received. NASS reports the annual average 
price received for each commodity, using data for spot and contract prices. 
Respondents to the ARMS contracting questions report the average price that 
they received for their contract shipments in 2008.
Table 14
Increases in contract coverage in U.S. corn, soybeans, and wheat
Farms with marketing contracts
Crop
Share of commodity  
under contract
Share of farms Share of total production Contracting intensity
2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008 2005 2008
---------------------------------------------------------- Percent ----------------------------------------------------------
Corn 19.3 27.4 22.0 36.7 44.4 56.9 43.5 48.2
Soybeans 15.5 27.4 17.8 34.0 33.8 50.7 45.8 54.1
Wheat 7.3 25.1 9.6 23.9 15.8 44.7 46.1 56.2
Note: Contracting intensity is the average share of production placed under contract by farms with contracts.
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2008, all versions. 
Table 15
Prices and quantities in U.S. field crop marketing contracts, 2008
Commodity
Item Corn Soybeans Wheat Rice Cotton
Price received per unit ($) -----------------------------Per bushel----------------------------- Per pound
     USDA/NASS mean, all sales 4.06 9.97 6.78 7.56 0.478
     Contract mean 4.89 10.85 7.26 6.63 0.617
     Contract 25th percentile 4.19 9.62 5.90 6.00 0.520
     Contract 75th percentile 5.50 12.00 8.66 7.39 0.749
 Quantity marketed through contract ------------------------------Bushel------------------------------ Pounds
      Median 8,000 3,000 4,300 30,000 250,000
      Mean 21,154 6,580 9,573 40,816 391,966
      25th percentile 3,300 1,200 2,000 22,000 116,400
      75th percentile 20,000 7,000 10,000 74,800 499,100
Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 2008,  
all versions (contract prices and quantities); and USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), annual prices received 
(USDA/NASS prices).27 
Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts in 2008 / EIB-72
Economic Research Service / USDA
Producers are more likely to choose marketing contracts than rely on spot 
markets for thinly traded, high-value varieties of a commodity. High-oil 
corn and low-linoleic soybeans carry price premiums, and each is likely to 
be produced under contract. If these varieties signal quality differences that 
are valued in the market, then contract prices should exceed cash prices at 
most times. But contract prices may also differ from season average prices if 
prices are changing sharply during the year. Contract prices tend to fluctuate 
less than cash prices and thus lag behind cash price changes (i.e., cash prices 
often exceed contract prices when prices are rising and fall below them when 
prices are falling). 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the time pattern of prices for corn and soybeans 
from 1996 to 2008, using annual average contract prices (drawn from 
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Corn contract prices lag NASS prices
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Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA’s Agricultural Resource 
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be exercised in making inferences from these comparisons. NASS reports 
monthly prices received, whereas the ARMS contract data are available on an 
annual basis only. NASS prices cover all grades and qualities, while contract 
prices are likely to cover standard grades and qualities. Contract respondents 
may cover a different spread than NASS respondents.  
Still, notable and persistent patterns are revealed in the price comparisons. 
Contract prices remain above NASS prices when NASS prices are stable or 
falling, and they fall below them when NASS prices are rising. As NASS 
prices rose sharply in 2007, they also rose above contract prices; but contract 
prices received a premium in 2008 as NASS prices fell late in the year.25
Quantities of commodities marketed through contracts range widely among 
farms, with the 75th percentile quantity being three to five times larger than 
the 25th percentile quantity for each commodity (see table 15). Farms that 
do not use contracts are unlikely to be deterred from doing so by quan-
tity commitments because the quantities themselves are not very large. At 
average 2008 yields, the median contract corn quantity (8,000 bushels) 
could be met with 52 acres and the interquartile range could be met with 21 
(the 25th percentile) to 130 acres. Similarly modest acreages are needed, at 
average yields, to meet the median soybean and wheat contracts—75 and 
96 acres, respectively—while the 25th quartile quantities could be met with 
30 and 40 acres, respectively.26 Corn, soybean and wheat producers usually 
commit only about half of their production to contracts (see table 11), and 
they may use several contracts. 
Marketing contracts for specialized varieties of field crops provide assured 
marketing outlets and prices tied to desired attributes that may be more costly 
to produce. But the growth in contracting has occurred among standard vari-
eties and likely reflects increased price risks in recent years. Such contracts 
are simpler than production contracts and, while they introduce new risks 
in the form of contract volume commitments, they do not govern the same 
capital commitment envisioned in livestock production contracts. With fluc-
tuations in prices likely to continue, more producers can be expected to use 
marketing contracts as a tool for risk management.
Institutional Change and Contracting Shifts:  
Peanuts and Tobacco
Some commodities show sharp changes in contracting in short periods of 
time. Such changes may be linked to institutional changes in the industries, 
deriving from changes in Government policy, in information flows, or in 
buyer organization. Peanuts and tobacco offer two such examples: each 
displayed sharp increases in contract usage after changes in Federal policy.
Contract coverage spread widely in the U.S. tobacco sector after major struc-
tural and policy changes. Marketing contracts were rarely used in tobacco 
prior to 1998. Until then, a system of marketing quotas controlled supply and 
limited spot market price risks, so producers had little interest in other risk-
management methods. Most tobacco was sold through spot markets in local 
auction houses. 
25This pattern also accounts for the 
exception in table 17—where contract 
prices for rice are well below NASS 
prices in 2008. While monthly NASS 
prices for corn, cotton, soybeans, and 
wheat peaked early in 2008 and then 
fell off sharply later in the year, rice 
prices continued to rise, peaking in No-
vember 2008 and falling in 2009. We 
would therefore expect contract prices 
to exceed NASS prices during 2009.
26The acreage required to fulfill median 
rice and cotton contracts was consid-
erably larger, at 200 and 307 acres, 
respectively, with average yields.29 
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Tobacco quality can vary widely across lots available for sale, and proces-
sors had long sought an expanded use of marketing contracts as a way to 
better link prices to qualities. Moreover, increasing international competition 
(both imports and exports) undermined the effectiveness of marketing quotas 
as a tool of price management. Production did start to shift to marketing 
contracts, after 1998, when the States and the tobacco industry reached an 
agreement called the “master settlement,” resolving lawsuits brought by 
the States against tobacco processors. The traditional tobacco program of 
marketing quotas and price supports was eliminated after 2004. 
Respondents to a 2008 ARMS tobacco version were asked about their use of 
contracts in 2008, 2004, and 2000. Contracts covered 25 percent of respon-
dents’ production in 2000 and 99 percent by 2008 (table 16). The traditional 
auction house system nearly disappeared in that short period—respondents 
reported that they could access 3.2 auction houses, on average, in 2000, but 
most had no auction houses available by 2008.
Marketing contracts for tobacco contain features aimed at product quality 
(fig. 7). Most contracts require bales of tobacco to contain leaves from only 
a single stalk position (quality and use varies with position). Most also set 
maximum allowable moisture levels and restrictions on chemical use in 
production. 
Contract coverage of peanuts expanded sharply after the 2002 elimination 
of the peanut marketing quota system (fig. 8). Marketing quotas were used 
to control domestic peanut supplies, which in turn allowed for stable and 
relatively high spot market prices (Dohlman et al., 2009). The elimination of 
marketing quotas loosened supply controls and thus created greater market 
price risks. In addition, timely market price information, which might have 
allowed producers to manage their risks, was not widely available. 
Marketing contracts were an important element of peanut production before 
the policy change—they covered 24-47 percent of production in each 
year between 1996 and 2002. But after elimination of the marketing quota 
Table 16
Changes in U.S. tobacco marketing
Item 2008 2004 2000
Marketing channel Share of production (percent)
   Marketing contract with tobacco company 97.2 78.0 23.4
   Marketing contract with cooperative 2.1 5.1 1.4
   Auction house(s) 0.4 15.4 72.5
   Other, including production contract 0.3 1.6 2.7
Marketing options Mean number available
   Tobacco companies 1.5 1.5 0.9
   Cooperatives 0.2 0.2 0.2
   Auction houses 0.3 1.6 3.2
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from USDA’s Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey, 2008, version 4.30
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program, contracts provided a way to manage increased price risks, and 
contract coverage expanded sharply. Since 2004, contracts have covered 
63-83 percent of production, a substantial increase over 1996-2002 (fig. 8). 
Peanut producers also perceive a shift toward the use of marketing contracts. 
The 2004 ARMS contained a peanut version, which went into the field in 
2005. Respondents were asked whether changes in the peanut program 
led them to rely more on contracts for peanut marketing, and 62.5 percent 
responded that it did. 
Data from ARMS clearly indicate that policy changes, in the form of the 
elimination of marketing quotas, led to sharp increases in contracting in 
tobacco and peanuts. Contracts provide a way to manage price risks and 
assure marketing outlets. But contracts are also used in tobacco to manage 
product qualities, with contract prices that are more closely tied to product 
attributes than they were in the auction house system.
Specific tobacco varieties
Bale has leaves from one stalk position
Maximum level of moisture content
Maximum residual for chemicals
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Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 
2008, version 2.
Figure 8
Share of peanut production under marketing contracts
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey, 












1996 98 02 04 06 08 2000
Marketing quotas 
eliminated after 2002
Responding in 2005, 63 percent 
of producers say that changes in 
the peanut program caused them 
to rely more on contracts31 
Agricultural Contracting Update: Contracts in 2008 / EIB-72
Economic Research Service / USDA
Conclusions
Contracting is a major feature of U.S. agriculture. In 2008, agricultural 
contracts covered 39 percent of U.S. agricultural production. Data from the 
Census of Agriculture indicate that contracts covered 11 percent of produc-
tion in 1969, so expanded contracting is an important feature of structural 
change in agriculture. 
But contract use varies widely across commodities. Contracts cover more 
than 90 percent of broiler, sugar beet, and tobacco production but less than 
30 percent of corn, soybean, and wheat production, where spot markets still 
predominate.
Because contracting is a substitute for spot markets, producers often shift 
to contracts because of perceived weaknesses in spot markets. For example, 
contracts are often used when producers perceive that they have very limited 
options for marketing their products—that is, when commodity buyers have 
market power. However, that does not necessarily mean that contracts are 
instruments of market power. Instead, contracts may serve to insulate farmers 
from the exercise of market power and induce farmers to invest in the equip-
ment and structures that will reduce costs for producing the contracted 
commodity. 
Contracts may also be used as a risk management tool when spot prices 
fluctuate widely or when there is limited information for managing price 
risks in spot markets. For example, ERS data show substantial shifts of corn, 
soybean, and wheat production to marketing contracts in 2008, a year of 
historically high, but fluctuating, spot prices. Contract coverage grew sharply 
in two markets, tobacco and peanuts, when the cessation of Government 
programs increased income risks in the markets and when alternative means 
of managing risks were not widely available. 
Contracts are evolving to cover new and often unforeseen developments. 
Standard poultry production contracts are designed so that the integrator 
provides feed and chicks, while the farm operator provides the onfarm equip-
ment, structures, labor, and utilities. Hog production contracts largely follow 
suit. Today more production contracts are specifying animal welfare and 
health standards, while some provide for joint financing of utility expenses. 
Production contracts are also evolving to handle more complex organiza-
tional structures, including third party (nongrower) ownership of housing. 
Cattle feedlots typically charged clients a fee for providing custom feeding 
and marketing services for the client’s cattle, but some feedlots now offer 
contracts that share equity ownership (of the cattle) between the feedlot and 
the client. 
Simple crop marketing contracts only set terms for selling a commodity, but 
others today may tie crop sales, seed purchases, and chemical purchases into 
a single agreement. Contracts that tie payment to product quality, in crop and 
livestock commodities, are frequently being redesigned to take account of 32
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changes in consumer preferences or in technologies for measuring quality. 
We can expect further ongoing changes in contract design to facilitate greater 
traceability of products and to allow new forms of risk-sharing, input provi-
sion, and equity participation in farms and farm products. Designing future 
surveys to track such shifts would enable policymakers and stakeholders to 
better understand the determinants and effects of agricultural contracts.33 
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